The Gorbachev Succession

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, Spring 1985

Summary:  Two trendlines suddenly intersected in March 1985. The arms control negotiations between the two superpowers resumed, after a long break that had threatened to become a permanent breakdown. As the delegations were arriving in Geneva, Konstantin Chernenko died in Moscow, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev was quickly named the new general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The succession to Leonid Brezhnev had at last been completed.

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

Not we but capitalism has to maneuver, camouflage its actions and resort to wars, terror, falsification and subversion in an effort to hold back the inexorable advance of time. . . . In terms of its intensity, content and methods, the ?psychological warfare? that imperialism is currently waging constitutes a special variety of aggression that flouts that sovereignty of countries.

Within a year, by the time of his visit to the United Kingdom, he was taking a more conciliatory line, thus supporting Chernenko?to the point that Prime Minister Thatcher said that he was a man she could do business with.

V

If the West can do business with Gorbachev, it will have to be on new terms worked out by both sides. If Gorbachev intends to consolidate the current turn in Soviet-American relations, the focal point has to be the arms negotiations in Geneva. He will have to address the issues without too much delay, and, in particular, decide how to cope with the famous Star Wars defense. The United States is not likely to yield to the blandishments and threats of the Soviet negotiators. Good atmospherics, an affable manner and clever tactics will not charm the United States under Ronald Reagan?though in the age of television and instant global communications Gorbachev may be a formidable public rival. The new Soviet leader will be challenged at some point to offer a realistic basis for compromise.

If and when such a Soviet offer is made, the United States will then be challenged to find a response, rather than rigidly insisting on its own proposals. A failure in Geneva this time could have vastly more serious consequences than the last breakdown, when the Soviets walked out in December 1983. This time we cannot simply wait for another turn in the Soviet leadership. The structure of the superpower relationship could collapse. This is a heavy burden on both leaders.

The shifts in superpower relations cannot be attributed only to the changes from Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko. The clash between the United States and the Soviet Union has deep roots in the conflicting national interests of each side?from Afghanistan to Poland to Nicaragua?to say nothing of the fierce strategic competition and the failures in arms control. In this broad sense, personalities are not overly important.

But it would be foolish to take a pseudo-Marxist view and dismiss the human factor altogether. Stalin made a difference. So did Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Now Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev takes their place. He is reported to be highly intelligent, quite capable, and bristling with energy. If so, then he should understand that at some point he will have to grapple with strategic realities. One of those realities is that the Soviet Union finds itself beset with problems: a potential explosion in its decaying East European empire; an endless war in Afghanistan; infectious religious fanaticism along its southern borders; vibrant adversaries in China and Japan. Above all, its main enemy (to borrow a phrase from Mao)?the United States?has proven its amazing resilience, ten years after the debacles of Vietnam and Watergate.

It may not be that the Soviet Union is headed for a historical decline, as some Americans have been too eager to predict. For Moscow still has opportunities for strategic gains in Europe, perhaps in China, and even in Central America. But the new leaders in Moscow should also recognize that the "correlation of forces" that they so carefully assess is no longer favorable to the Soviet Union. Thus, it may be an opportune moment for a new leader to establish an equilibrium with the United States. It would not be a bad policy for Gorbachev to consider as he prepares for the next Party Congress, which should be held late this year. The new Five Year Plan should be adopted at that time, and Gorbachev will have an opportunity to shore up his political leadership.

Perhaps the most that can be said at this very early point is that vitality seems to be the watchword of the Gorbachev succession. There are certainly dangers in a Soviet Union that is pressing outward, under new and more dynamic leadership. (A "Soviet Kennedy" has been a recurring Western nightmare.) But belligerence is not Gorbachev?s only option; he may choose to tend to the malaise in Soviet society. His first pronouncements point in that direction.

The United States, in the Bush mission to Chernenko?s funeral and the Reagan invitation to Gorbachev, seems to be extending its hand. A summit meeting seems likely. There is always the risk of another "peace offensive" designed to buy time for a new Soviet leadership, as was the case of the Geneva Summit of 1955. Nevertheless, there are some grounds for optimism at this critical juncture in the relations between the two superpowers.