The Gorbachev Succession

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, Spring 1985

Summary:  Two trendlines suddenly intersected in March 1985. The arms control negotiations between the two superpowers resumed, after a long break that had threatened to become a permanent breakdown. As the delegations were arriving in Geneva, Konstantin Chernenko died in Moscow, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev was quickly named the new general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The succession to Leonid Brezhnev had at last been completed.

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

This is not true of the Soviet Union. The Stalinist system has been maturing for decades. It cannot be easily reshaped. Soviet officials, with some indignation, insist that the U.S.S.R. is not Hungary, that reforms that are possible in a small economy are not applicable to the vast machinery of the Soviet Union. And, even if Gorbachev is determined to make significant changes, what would be their essence? Will a tired party apparatus be able to institute a dynamic economic reform program that would threaten that party?s very legitimacy? Or will the party have to be shaken and reformed as well? But this was Khrushchev?s downfall?an example Gorbachev surely must remember.

Nonetheless, we must be prepared for a period in which the Soviet Union does attempt to throw off some of the dead weight of the past. Gorbachev seems likely to be a vigorous leader, forceful and dynamic. Is this in the Western interest?

IV

Strange as it may seem, a healthy, self-confident Soviet Union may now be more in the Western interest than an adversary that is brooding and snarling to cover its fears and weaknesses. Some observers believe that only when the domestic crisis deepens will we witness any genuine reforms or shifts in Soviet foreign policy. But one aspect of that crisis may now be over, with the change in leadership. At this stage in the nuclear era, the President of the United States needs a reliable counterpart in the Kremlin who can commit the U.S.S.R. beyond the next change in the old guard. The United States needs to negotiate with a leadership that is not cowed by the fear of compromise. And the United States should want a leadership that will recognize that the Soviet Union needs to put its own house in order instead of taking refuge in a bombastic and dangerous foreign policy.

This does not mean that the Gorbachev succession is all to the good. He is an untested and, to a large extent, unknown quantity. He could even prove a short-term leader. His road to power has been almost effortless?and, to a degree, fortuitous. It remains to be seen whether he has the ruthlessness that is a prerequisite for ruling in the Kremlin.

It would also be rash to conclude that activism means genuine reform. A shrewd Soviet leader can operate for a long time by treating the symptoms of the U.S.S.R.?s problems rather than attacking the structural base. Nor can we assume that liberal economic reforms mean conciliatory foreign policies. It is much too early to diagram a Soviet game plan. But we have to take careful note of certain objective factors that operate on Soviet foreign policy.

Gorbachev inherits a foreign policy that recently suffered a major failure, which has been only partially repaired. During the interregnum since Brezhnev, the U.S.S.R. met with one of its worst and most significant defeats: failing utterly to prevent the U.S. deployment of missiles in Western Europe. This failure may have been partly because, as the confrontation over the missiles unfolded, Brezhnev was no longer up to the challenge. As usual, the Soviets relied too heavily on the "peace forces" in Europe and on German politics to head off the U.S. deployments. Moreover, while Brezhnev was ailing, major diplomatic openings were missed. Andropov ran to catch up, turning out proposals almost every month; but he fell seriously ill, and a possible slight turn in tactics was snuffed out by the Korean airline disaster in September 1983, which coincided with the beginning of his final illness. It is still fascinating to speculate about who made the ghastly decisions during this crisis. What was Gorbachev?s role? He was, after all, thought to be Andropov?s second in command at that time. If so, he did not suffer from the crisis, whereas the chief Soviet public spokesman, Marshal Ogarkov, was removed from office a year later.

It was left to Konstantin Chernenko to salvage what he could. A Brezhnev protégé who had advanced in the years of détente, Chernenko apparently fell back on that experience?creating an opening to the Americans. His initial instinct was to shift away from the harshness of superpower relations. His first major speech on March 2, 1984, seemed to move in this direction. He laid out several measures that could be taken to rebuild confidence. It seemed like the beginning of a new dialogue. But something or someone interfered (perhaps the old guard could not agree). Relations worsened when the Soviet Union pulled out of the Los Angeles Olympics. But a sudden turnaround began shortly thereafter, when on June 29, 1984, the Chernenko administration invited the United States to new arms control talks, thus refuting the conventional wisdom that the Soviets would not do business with Ronald Reagan. Despite the failure of that particular exchange, by the early fall Gromyko was in Washington chatting with the very man who had written off the Soviet Union as an "evil empire."

The new line was shored up in innumerable statements and interviews attributed to Chernenko, thus suggesting that he had played an important role in initiating the turn toward the United States. Even when he was taken ill, the new line was not abandoned, suggesting collective support of the Politburo. By then, however, the Soviet leadership was under the nominal control of Gorbachev, who for his part took a rather conciliatory position during his visit to the United Kingdom. And the Soviets nailed down the opening of new arms control talks. In his initial address to the Central Committee after taking power, Gorbachev confirmed that there was indeed a new line, when he fondly recalled the détente of the 1970s in terms reminiscent of Brezhnev. And the Soviet delegation in Geneva ostentatiously revealed that Gorbachev had presided over the Politburo meeting of March 7 that authorized their negotiating instructions.

It is easy to dismiss Gorbachev?s early statements as campaign rhetoric. After all, one would not expect the new general secretary to start his career by frightening his audiences with threats of war. Yet it was only a year ago that the Soviet Union was warning of the danger of a new war. The late minister of defense, Marshal Dmitri Ustinov, was one of the most strident voices; Gromyko, with some reluctance, seemed to fall into line. Romanov lacerated the United States: "The American reactionaries are ready to commit any crime, even the vilest one, to incite tensions." And Gorbachev echoed some of the same language in December 1983: