The Gorbachev Succession

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, Spring 1985

Summary:  Two trendlines suddenly intersected in March 1985. The arms control negotiations between the two superpowers resumed, after a long break that had threatened to become a permanent breakdown. As the delegations were arriving in Geneva, Konstantin Chernenko died in Moscow, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev was quickly named the new general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The succession to Leonid Brezhnev had at last been completed.

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

In any case, Andropov proved to be something of a surprise. Thought to be the representative of the old orthodoxy by virtue of his service in the dreaded KGB, he loomed as a potentially disruptive force?but as a reformer. His campaign against corruption seemed to herald more sweeping changes, perhaps even a shift to the liberal economic reforms of Hungary, where Andropov had served in the 1950s. It was against this background that Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the nominal second in command and a potential successor; thus, Gorbachev came to be closely identified with the reform faction.

To be designated as the successor is a dubious and dangerous honor. The position has been occupied by many Soviet leaders who then passed into oblivion (Kirichenko, Kozlov, Kirilenko). Gorbachev?s success in surviving the change from Andropov to Chernenko, and then assuming power so smoothly, suggests he has formidable political skills, a conclusion that seems borne out by the firsthand testimony of his British interlocutors during his visit to London last December.

Yet the transfer of power from Chernenko to Gorbachev was the tip of the iceberg. Below the waterline, Soviet politics was marked by the clash between the forces of continuity and the imperative of change. The tendencies toward reform that began under Andropov (presumably supported by Gorbachev) were stifled under Chernenko?s brief reign. Indeed, some advocates of economic reform were officially chastised in one of those Aesopian pronouncements that signal major controversy in Soviet politics. The magazine that had sponsored some suggestions of change was forced to apologize for its errors.

The strength of the old guard was also dramatically demonstrated in September 1984, when the chief of the general staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, was summarily dismissed, and sent to the military equivalent of Siberia. His ostensible error was that he complained too publicly about the economic inefficiencies that were blocking the kind of military progress necessary if the Soviet Union was to adjust to an era of nuclear stalemate. One suspects that he was removed less for his heretical views than for his boldness in challenging the aging political coalition in the Politburo. It is intriguing to speculate about the military?s position in politics, now that Chernenko has departed. Could there be a comeback for professional officers such as Ogarkov? One thinks of Marshal Zhukov?s career. It was this general atmosphere of reaction under Chernenko that led to speculation that the new successor would not be Gorbachev, but the more conservative Grigory Romanov. One can wonder whether this would have been the outcome had Chernenko lingered on.

III

Now the Gorbachev era begins. The conventional wisdom in the West is that we should not expect much change until Gorbachev has consolidated his position. It took Khrushchev a full three years to defeat his rivals for Stalin?s mantle. It took Brezhnev about four to five years to emerge from the group that overthrew Khrushchev. One would expect a younger, less experienced leader to take even longer. Moreover, Soviet history suggests that succession struggles lead to strange turns in policy. Stalin vilified Trotsky, drove him out of the Soviet Union in 1929, but then adopted his economic program. Khrushchev attacked Malenkov for his heretical departures from Stalinism, then used de-Stalinization to drive out Molotov. In the Khrushchev era it was Frol Kozlov, the potential successor, who was portrayed as the Stalinist (in a famous poem by Yevtushenko), but it was Kozlov?s rival, Brezhnev, who prevailed and then halted the attacks on the memory of the dead dictator in the name of restoring stability.

Thus it is conceivable?indeed consistent with Soviet history?that Gorbachev too will be forced to carry out the careful maneuvers, strike the political bargains, and engage in the shifts of policy that the system requires if he is to hold on to power in the Kremlin. But there is also reason to believe that this will not prove to be the case this time. Gorbachev?s position as second in command was only mildly challenged when Chernenko was in office in the summer and fall of last year (1984). He has been presiding over the Politburo for some time, and the circumstances of his accession to Chernenko?s position suggest a prior decision, one dating back perhaps several months. And most important, he does not assume power as only the first among equals, as was the case with Andropov and Chernenko.

The Gorbachev Politburo, which shrank to only ten members when Chernenko died, is not a collection of powerful contenders, as was the case when Stalin died or when Khrushchev was overthrown. The Gorbachev Politburo has two tiers: the remainder of the old guard (Andrei Gromyko, Nikolai Tikhonov, Viktor Grishin, Mikhail Solomentsev and Vladimir Shcherbitsky) and several younger members. His rivals are not particularly impressive. It is difficult to put Grishin, the long-time leader of the party bureau in Moscow, in the same category as Molotov in 1953 or Kosygin in 1964. This does not mean that Gorbachev?s power approaches that of Brezhnev in his prime. The old guard, especially the durable Prime Minister Tikhonov and the redoubtable foreign minister, Gromyko, clearly will influence politics and policy. Moreover, Grigory Romanov, who might have succeeded Chernenko, remains a potential rival for Gorbachev.

Politics in the Kremlin does not stop simply because of a change in generations. Nevertheless, the position of general secretary carries with it enormous power and wide prerogatives. And there is ample room on the Politburo for Gorbachev to build up his own base of power. He acts like a man in charge, and there may be good reason for his self-confidence. We may well be spared the dreary process of Kremlin infighting.

Gorbachev?s emergence as a reformer seems now to be taken for granted?at least in the West. "Impatient Seeker of Economic Change," ran one headline in an American newspaper. His most frequently quoted statement has been: "We will have to carry out profound transformations in the economy and in the entire system of social relations." Yet the Soviet Union is not China, where a nearly magical transformation could take hold because Mao?s system had made only a scratch on an ancient society.