Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy

Admiral Stansfield Turner and Captain George Thibault

From Foreign Affairs, Fall 1982

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Summary:  The U.S. military establishment is at a historic turning point. It can continue with the same strategy that has dominated its thinking, training and procurement for the past 32 years. That is a concept of prepared defenses and predeployed forces in Europe and in Korea, along with forward-deployed naval forces, on the assumption that being ready for those requirements will automatically be adequate for whatever other contingencies may arise.

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (ret.), was Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1981. Previously, he was Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and President of the Naval War College, among other positions. Captain George Thibault, USN, is Chairman of the Department of Military Strategy at the National War College. The views expressed in this article are personal, and do not imply Department of Defense endorsement of factual accuracy or opinion.

The U.S. military establishment is at a historic turning point. It can continue with the same strategy that has dominated its thinking, training and procurement for the past 32 years. That is a concept of prepared defenses and predeployed forces in Europe and in Korea, along with forward-deployed naval forces, on the assumption that being ready for those requirements will automatically be adequate for whatever other contingencies may arise.

Alternatively, it can recognize that the world has changed since the late 1940s, and take those changes into account by revising its strategy through placing more emphasis on the flexibility needed to move forces to wherever the United States may require them. Such a strategy would call for greater stress on our capabilities to use the seas and be prepared for unexpected military contingencies, rather than just for the clearly defined problems of defending Europe and Korea.

The Reagan Administration has declared that it wants naval superiority and that it wants to accelerate the Rapid Deployment Force that has been building for more than two years. It has directed an abrupt shift in defense resources to these ends. The Navy will, for instance, take the largest share of the next defense budget if the Congress agrees.

Still, one does not get the feeling that a serious debate is taking place or that an express decision to reorient our military strategy has been made. Instead, we see clear indicators of strong resistance to any shift in strategy: from those elements of the military that would have to change most and their supporters in Congress; from defense contractors who build the equipment we have been using for years and whose interests might be adversely affected; and from traditional Atlanticists who abjure any tampering with our long-established security relationship with Europe.

II

Foreign Affairs has just published a strong argument against change by Ambassador Robert Komer that typifies the resistance of Atlanticists.1 Mr. Komer argues for a "coalition" strategy which places primary reliance on working closely with our allies to build a common defense for Europe and Korea and for any other areas where we have vital interests on the periphery of the Eurasian land mass. He acknowledges that our present coalition strategy is not working well enough and suggests a program of "rejuvenation" that would call for the allies to carry a greater share of the defense burden and to effect numerous efficiencies. He recognizes as well that sea control is indispensable to all of our overseas military activities.

What he resists is a shift to a "maritime strategy" that would go beyond controlling the seas and would use the seas to project power against the Soviet Union. Here he is on solid ground and is justifiably concerned. One use of maritime power under this concept would be attacks by aircraft or missiles from ships directly onto the Soviet homeland. Another use would be "horizontal escalations" or attacks on Soviet interests outside the homeland, e.g., their merchant marine, Cuba or South Yemen. ...

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