The Middle East: A House of Containment Built on Shifting Sands

John C. Campbell

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1981

Article preview: first 500 of 15,359 words total.

Summary:  If either Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan needed any special persuasion to become convinced of the centrality of the Middle East in the total picture of American foreign policy, harsh experience provided it. The former had some notable diplomatic successes in the region, the Camp David accords and the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, but he struggled through the final year of his presidency under the impact of two shattering events?the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However history may judge his efforts to cope with them, there was no avoiding the impression of a humiliated and frustrated America which must have contributed to his electoral defeat in November 1980. President Reagan came into office determined to restore American strength and prestige, but one year later his Administration, shocked by the assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt, at odds with Israel after a series of disputes culminating in the barbed exchange following Israel?s de facto annexation of the Golan Heights, and unable either to put aside the Palestine problem or make any progress toward settling it, was still groping for a political structure on which to build the position of strength deemed necessary to hold off the Russians and protect vital oil supplies.

John C. Campbell is former Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of, among other books, Defense of the Middle East and The West and the Middle East.

If either Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan needed any special persuasion to become convinced of the centrality of the Middle East in the total picture of American foreign policy, harsh experience provided it. The former had some notable diplomatic successes in the region, the Camp David accords and the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, but he struggled through the final year of his presidency under the impact of two shattering events-the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However history may judge his efforts to cope with them, there was no avoiding the impression of a humiliated and frustrated America which must have contributed to his electoral defeat in November 1980. President Reagan came into office determined to restore American strength and prestige, but one year later his Administration, shocked by the assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt, at odds with Israel after a series of disputes culminating in the barbed exchange following Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan Heights, and unable either to put aside the Palestine problem or make any progress toward settling it, was still groping for a political structure on which to build the position of strength deemed necessary to hold off the Russians and protect vital oil supplies.

President Carter bequeathed to his successor a policy of containment: a commitment publicly declared in January 1980 to repel, by force if necessary, any Soviet attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf region; a decision to build up U.S. military power, including a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) which could be brought to bear in that region; and a hope of gaining for the containment policy strong support from other nations. He also bequeathed an American role, as partner, in the continuing negotiation between Israel and Egypt under the Camp David accords. The making of peace between those two countries was going well and was to be completed by Israel's withdrawal from the remainder of the Sinai peninsula in April 1982. The other part of the Camp David process, the establishment of autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was not going well at all; in fact, the negotiations had made no real progress for more than a year. President Sadat had counted on a tripartite summit meeting-himself, Prime Minister Begin and President Carter-to be held late in 1980 to revive them with a better chance of success. But Carter's defeat at the polls put an abrupt end to that idea.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, American policy at the end of the Carter term was a patchwork of bits and pieces and blank spots. Relations with Iran had been dominated by the question of the American hostages, who were not released until the President's last day in office. As long as the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) should remain in power, the prospects for a government with which the United States could have even minimal relations would be remote. Iran, moreover, was ...

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