U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Long Road Back

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1981

Summary:  American presidents have usually inherited poor relations with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, of course, was confronted by the tensions of Korea and President Kennedy by the Berlin crisis. Lyndon Johnson was a temporary exception, but Richard Nixon inherited Vietnam and the Czech crisis. Gerald Ford had to deal with a faltering détente, and Jimmy Carter was embroiled in early disputes. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan found himself in much the same position as his predecessors, except that relations were worse than usual. Indeed, relations were frozen. Even the outgoing Administration was pessimistic. The departing American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Thomas J. Watson, Jr., summed up the prevailing gloom: "I don't think the West has any conception of how dismal the future looks for East-West relations."

William G. Hyland is currently a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in the Department of State in 1974-75 and as Deputy Director of the National Security Council Staff from 1975 to 1977.

In their dealing with Moscow, Nixon and Kissinger brought a number of diverse forces and issues to bear at roughly the right time; after demonstrating resistance to Soviet-sponsored forays in Cuba and negotiating their way through the Jordanian and India-Pakistan crises, Nixon gained significant leverage when he decided to bomb Haiphong in May 1972. His summit strategy was saved not because the Soviets flinched, but because they did not want to jettison the German treaties and the Berlin agreements still pending in the West German Bundestag, or provide a new opening for China, or, for that matter, to endure an anti-ballistic missile race. Similarly, détente began to collapse when Washington was unable to turn back adverse trends: the collapse in Saigon, Soviet intervention in Angola, or the constant infighting over defense and SALT (to say nothing of the consequences of Watergate).

For Reagan the lesson should not merely be that he needs to impose penalties for Soviet misconduct: this is his natural inclination in any case. He also needs to create some incentives for the Soviets, and, above all, he must begin to relate issues to each other. Restraint and reciprocity are valid but inert slogans. They must be applied in some meaningful manner. Where do we want reciprocity: in European arms control? Where do we want restraint: Poland, Iran, Saudi Arabia? What do we offer in return: restraint in Chinese arms sales? Spelling out these equations is the essence of diplomacy. Deciding to do so is the essence of statesmanship.

The Reagan Administration has not done so in 1981. Indeed, it probably could not do so before straightening out its domestic economic programs, including its defense and strategic weapons programs. But in 1982 it should begin to untangle a number of internal divisions and to indicate to our allies and the Soviet leaders a clearer sense of the alternatives. At some point in the process, a summit meeting may be necessary.

Which brings up the Soviet side. It is a great temptation, but usually an error, to gear American policy to the intricacies of Kremlin politics. We will never really know the array of Soviet internal forces-when it is a propitious time to move, and when it is not. Following American interests is obviously a better guide. But the Soviet side is not irrelevant. And the role of Leonid Brezhnev is still quite central.

Brezhnev has staked much of his stewardship on improving relations with the United States and West Germany. One reason certainly has been his abiding concern about China. Another may be the economic benefits he had hoped for and has, in part, received. In any case, what and who will follow him is a mystery. The best case would be a period of internal consolidation, the worst case an aggressive thrust to cash in on a new strategic balance. It is probably in the interest of the United States and of the Reagan Administration to explore the possibility of restoring a better relationship with the Soviet Union while Brezhnev can still put it through the Politburo. Some of the post-Mao difficulties in Sino-American relations might be an object lesson.

No outside observer can sketch out the numerous intermediate steps involved in restoring some balance to Soviet-American relations. There has been too great an accumulation of serious conflicts not to be pessimistic about the chances for much change. But given the many difficulties confronting the Soviet Union, there may still be an opportunity for American diplomacy to work out acceptable terms. One question is whether the Administration of Ronald Reagan has any real interest in moving toward a new relationship. Despite the Polish crisis, such a desire seemed to be still alive at the end of the year. In his message of December 29 announcing sanctions against the Soviet Union, the President stated:

The United States wants a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union. We intend to maintain a high level dialogue. But we are prepared to proceed in whatever direction the Soviet Union decides upon-towards great mutual restraint and cooperation, or further down a harsh and less rewarding path.

It was an appropriately ambivalent note on which to end 1981.

1 Quoted by President Reagan in his speech before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., November 18, 1981.

2 The Threat to Europe, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981.