U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Long Road Back

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1981

Summary:  American presidents have usually inherited poor relations with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, of course, was confronted by the tensions of Korea and President Kennedy by the Berlin crisis. Lyndon Johnson was a temporary exception, but Richard Nixon inherited Vietnam and the Czech crisis. Gerald Ford had to deal with a faltering détente, and Jimmy Carter was embroiled in early disputes. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan found himself in much the same position as his predecessors, except that relations were worse than usual. Indeed, relations were frozen. Even the outgoing Administration was pessimistic. The departing American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Thomas J. Watson, Jr., summed up the prevailing gloom: "I don't think the West has any conception of how dismal the future looks for East-West relations."

William G. Hyland is currently a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in the Department of State in 1974-75 and as Deputy Director of the National Security Council Staff from 1975 to 1977.

The other view was that Poland was drifting toward a disaster and needed Western assistance. If the economy continued to deteriorate, the inevitable result would be disorder and Soviet intervention. Assistance in stabilizing the situation was a gamble well worth taking and would ultimately benefit Solidarity. Reform of the economy could not even be contemplated in the midst of a crisis. This view did not prevail until shortly before Jaruzelski's coup. In failing to adopt a more positive approach to the Polish issue, the United States risked recriminations for watching and waiting too long.4

The Jaruzelski coup caught the West completely underprepared, and the initial reactions were largely improvised. Two general options seemed possible: to retaliate swiftly and strongly, even going so far as to freeze all East-West negotiations, or to defer the more drastic measures for use if the situation worsened. The Reagan Administration settled on a course between these alternatives. It was well out in front of its allies in announcing sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union, but the content of its measures was modest. The prospect for going further-such as denouncing the Helsinki accords-was not ruled out, but dependent on allied agreement which was very unlikely.

Beyond immediate reactions, a more fundamental question remained to be addressed by the West and by the United States in particular. Could a viable relationship with the Soviet Union, especially in Europe, continue to be based on a divisible détente in which the Soviets dominated every aspect of Eastern Europe, while the West continued to expand economic relations and other contacts, conclude arms control agreements, and promote a general political relaxation? For most of the postwar period the West accepted European spheres of influence without an official acknowledgment. Thus the Soviet position was never challenged in any of the Eastern crises. Why, then, should Poland be an exception? It was, after all, virtually at the center of the Soviet security zone.

Some in Europe argued that this was in fact the situation, and that it was only realistic to accept it. It was naive to believe that the Soviets would permit the situation to go so far as to challenge their position of dominance. And, they argued, a Polish solution was preferable to a Soviet solution. Hence, the West should proceed with great care, condemning the actions of Jaruzelski, but not drawing any drastic consequences for the general course of East-West relations. Direct Soviet military intervention, of course, would alter the situation; short of that, sanctions would only push the Polish regime closer to Moscow.

The Reagan Administration seemed to accept some of this reasoning in practice; at least its sanctions were carefully calibrated, and it had to give priority to protecting the Western alliance against new divisions. But Washington also seemed to be groping for a new position that challenged the postwar tradition. This interpretation held that Poland was in fact unique because it has occurred after the German treaties with Moscow and Warsaw and after the Helsinki conference of 1975. The 1970s thus marked a fundamental change in the European situation. Yalta was overtaken. A new political framework had been created: a sort of World War II peace treaty, in which the West recognized the territorial status quo in the East, and, in return, the East accepted certain principles of relations that implied a greater toleration of diversity and autonomy. Thus, an equilibrium was created between legitimate Soviet security interests and legitimate Western aspirations for a more relaxed European order. This general view was reflected in some of the statements of the Secretary of State in an interview with The Washington Post on December 26.

This interpretation-that Helsinki created a "whole new framework of international relations"-was bound to become an area of conflict not only with the the Soviet Union but within NATO. The Polish crisis exposed a serious Western disagreement over the concept of European security. The United States was boycotting a Soviet gas pipeline financed by its European allies. Both the United States and Europe accused Moscow of violating the Helsinki accords, but only the United States applied sanctions. Moreover, the Europeans still considered arms control agreement on missiles "imperative," while Washington contemplated ending the talks. A common approach to East-West issues had become mandatory. For the first time in at least a decade, serious concerns were raised in the United States about the viability of the Western alliance, a trend Moscow was certain to exploit.

VI

In relations with the Soviet Union, Ronald Reagan is rapidly approaching a crossroads. There is still a mutual Soviet-American interest in improving relations and some incentive to do so. From a domestic standpoint the President is supported by a favorable constellation of political forces. Just as Nixon had the anti-communist credentials to develop an opening to Peking, so Reagan has the credentials to initiate a new relationship with the U.S.S.R. And he is creating the prerequisite military base. He will have to make some political concessions to Moscow, but he can expect and obtain some concessions in return. He does not have to embrace détente. He can learn from his predecessors the dangers of overselling (Nixon), as well as undercommitting (Carter).

The President seems to be a perceptive student. When it was appropriate early in his first year to sound a strong theme of rearmament, he eschewed some of the softer rhetoric. But as the realities of alliance responsibilities and the pressure of domestic politics began to congeal, he was more than willing to move in surprisingly unanticipated directions: the MX decision in October and the arms control speech of November 18. That speech may well have marked the end of the opening phase of the Reagan foreign policy, but the Polish crisis intervened and introduced new uncertainties.

What the President needs now is a strategy to see him through the next two years.