U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Long Road Back

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1981

Summary:  American presidents have usually inherited poor relations with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, of course, was confronted by the tensions of Korea and President Kennedy by the Berlin crisis. Lyndon Johnson was a temporary exception, but Richard Nixon inherited Vietnam and the Czech crisis. Gerald Ford had to deal with a faltering détente, and Jimmy Carter was embroiled in early disputes. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan found himself in much the same position as his predecessors, except that relations were worse than usual. Indeed, relations were frozen. Even the outgoing Administration was pessimistic. The departing American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Thomas J. Watson, Jr., summed up the prevailing gloom: "I don't think the West has any conception of how dismal the future looks for East-West relations."

William G. Hyland is currently a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in the Department of State in 1974-75 and as Deputy Director of the National Security Council Staff from 1975 to 1977.

Soviet-American relations thus remain surrounded by a strong sense of foreboding. Despite the prospects of a summit meeting in 1982, only a small start has been made on the long road back to something resembling a more normal relationship.

II

Every Administration since Truman's has felt obliged to express an interest in achieving greater security through arms control. Each Administration has been skeptical of the prospects for any durable arrangement to restrict, let alone reduce, the level of weapons. Yet, American Presidents and those who seek the office cannot afford to denounce the humane objective of controlling nuclear weapons. The most they can do is to oppose a specific agreement, or insist that much better, safer solutions are possible. As a candidate, Reagan took this course by opposing the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), while insisting that substantial reductions could be achieved provided America began to rearm to impress on Moscow that the alternative to agreement was a severe competition.

Given this approach, the Reagan Administration had to give priority to the resolution of certain strategic issues, primarily how to deal with the much advertised "window of strategic vulnerability." This theory held that U.S. land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were or would be highly vulnerable to a Soviet surgical strike; Soviet ICBMs, however, were almost immune because of the limitations on U.S. ICBM capabilities. The United States, therefore, had to deploy a new, larger ICBM capable of threatening the Soviet force, but deceptively based in multiple "shelters" so as to exhaust any potential Soviet attack. By 1986-89, the infamous window would not only be closed, but the Soviets would also feel the harsh draft of their own vulnerability. Confronted by such a prospect, Moscow supposedly would negotiate an accommodation in SALT III.

This scenario was initially embraced by Reagan, especially the catch phrase of the "window." But the timing of the MX program, its technical and political complexity, and its SALT origins made it suspect. Many Reaganites argued that a "quick fix" was needed. But quick fixes are by definition elusive (otherwise, preceding administrations would have grabbed them). Negotiation from strength was a theory looking for an operational plan. This was one dimension of the strategic problem confronting Reagan.

The other dimension involved Europe. The Administration inherited the dual-track NATO decision of December 1979: the first track was to deploy 572 new American intermediate-range missiles in Europe starting in 1983; the second track was to negotiate with the Soviet Union for an arms control agreement covering intermediate-range missiles on both sides. With Washington now strongly emphasizing the military character of U.S.-Soviet relations, a backlash sprang up in Europe, where for a variety of reasons the Soviet threat was viewed less urgently. The NATO allies were suffering under diverse but severe political pressures applied by a bewildering coalition of anti-nuclear, pacifist, environmentalist and other activists. The Europeans argued that they would not and could not sacrifice détente to justify Reagan's campaign predilections. In their view, détente in Europe had, after all, brought about a significant reduction of tensions over Berlin and Germany, expanded economic relations, and even contributed to the beginnings of the Polish revolution. The way out of the growing transatlantic conflict was to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union over theater nuclear forces in Europe. Otherwise, it seemed likely that the worst outcome would be realized: NATO would unilaterally abandon or scale down its TNF deployment plans, while the rapidly growing Soviet force of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles would be unaffected by the clamoring crowds in Bonn, Amsterdam or Aldermaston.

The nature of these European anxieties was badly misperceived by some elements of the Reagan Administration, whose initial response was to cry appeasement. But there was also in the Administration an underlying suspicion of the Carter TNF plan because it was believed to be militarily flawed. Land-based missiles in Europe would be vulnerable to a Soviet preemptive attack. They were cumbersome and lacked real mobility, and in times of crisis their rapid movement into firing position would be subject to European political vetoes. Deploying 572 new missiles in any case was not an effective counter to the longer range and highly mobile Soviet SS-20s, which in early 1981 were already at a level of 600-700 warheads. Countering them would require a much larger force with longer range than the Pershing missiles, which was politically infeasible in Central Europe. For the Reagan Administration, an attractive alternative was to fill the strategic gap with sea-based cruise missiles-truly mobile, under American command, and consistent with a new strategic emphasis on naval power. But such a shift risked "decoupling," i.e., creating the impression that the United States was eager to avoid a firm link between the territorial defense of Europe and the use of America's central, strategic weapons. This risk was enhanced by the impression in Europe that the Reagan Defense Department was looking for ways to disengage from the Continent in favor of an off-shore strategy, supposedly based on the British nineteenth-century model (incidentally, a bad misreading of history).

The Soviets, of course, exploited the European climate, as well as the growing divergency between Washington and its NATO allies. Brezhnev threw out a number of approaches. Basically, what he proposed in 1980-81 was a simple bargain: NATO should suspend its program, and Moscow would negotiate a "substantial" reduction in its intermediate-range missile force. This would be reasonable because-the Soviets contended-a balance of "intermediate" forces already existed of around 900 to 1000 on each side if one counted the British and French strategic forces and U.S. aircraft on carriers and in Europe (the so-called forward-based systems). It followed from this view that the new American missiles would radically alter the balance and, of course, force the Soviets to adopt a counter program. A bargain need not even await the resumption of SALT, even though the Soviets acknowledge that theater and strategic military forces were related.

For much of 1981, Brezhnev had the field to himself because of the Administration's resistance to premature negotiations. The Reagan Administration saw an early commitment to negotiate as a threat to the timetable for implementing the TNF program. Even if the Administration decided to enter talks with the Soviet Union, their preferred purpose would be to legitimize further NATO deployments, or to justify the shift to sea-based forces.

Inside the Administration there were strong counter-arguments to this tactical approach. The pro-negotiating group, largely in the State Department, argued that the NATO alliance was dangerously strained, and weak governments were under strong political pressure. Reagan's election was being used in Europe by critics who claimed that war was suddenly more likely, and his refusal to negotiate over SALT or theater weapons was cited as proof. Moreover, a stubborn refusal to explore a European accommodation on nuclear weapons, a solemn American commitment since December 1979, could only aggravate European relations. In a second-level NATO meeting on March 31, the Administration tentatively agreed to resume the talks on theater nuclear weapons but to hold back on SALT.