U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Long Road Back

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1981

Summary:  American presidents have usually inherited poor relations with the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, of course, was confronted by the tensions of Korea and President Kennedy by the Berlin crisis. Lyndon Johnson was a temporary exception, but Richard Nixon inherited Vietnam and the Czech crisis. Gerald Ford had to deal with a faltering détente, and Jimmy Carter was embroiled in early disputes. In January 1981, Ronald Reagan found himself in much the same position as his predecessors, except that relations were worse than usual. Indeed, relations were frozen. Even the outgoing Administration was pessimistic. The departing American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Thomas J. Watson, Jr., summed up the prevailing gloom: "I don't think the West has any conception of how dismal the future looks for East-West relations."

William G. Hyland is currently a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in the Department of State in 1974-75 and as Deputy Director of the National Security Council Staff from 1975 to 1977.

- to restore the military balance, achieving or preserving at least a true equality and preferably superiority in key equations (e.g., naval power). The Soviets were developing a nuclear war-fighting capability, the new Deputy Secretary of Defense testified, and "we are going to have to develop the same."

- to contain Soviet expansion and reverse it; Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig warned that Moscow was the "greatest source of international insecurity."

- to negotiate only from a position of genuine strength; refurbishing America's nuclear arsenal was "a necessary prerequisite" for negotiation, the new Secretary of Defense concluded.

- and, above all, to dispel the psychological lethargy of America and its allies in dealing with the Soviet Union; hence the new rhetoric: "It is not going to be business as usual," the new White House Chief of Staff, James A. Baker, explained in early February 1981.

The Soviets' response to the "new direction" in American policy was hardly a surprise. They have been dealing with successive American administrations from a well-developed post-Stalin strategy. First, the new Administration would be greeted with a generous offer to talk, to meet, and to settle "outstanding differences." Then, there would be a display of pique over a hesitant or negative American response. Then would come a Soviet decision point: either to launch more aggressive testing or to shift to a posture of more genuine accommodation. This process was usually not a matter of weeks or months, but often of one or two years.

The Reagan-Brezhnev encounter has passed through the first stage and is well into the second. During the election campaign there had been no great sympathy for Ronald Reagan. At a Central Committee plenum in mid-1980, the Soviets had concluded that no matter who occupied the White House, certain adverse trends were developing in American policy: strategic rearmament (the new mobile MX missile), rapprochement with China (including arms sales) and refurbishing NATO strategy and forces with new Pershing and cruise missile deployments. Nevertheless, the Soviets seemed puzzled by the prospect of a Reagan presidency. Would it be reminiscent of the Nixon presidency, in that a conservative would move toward the Soviet Union? Or would it be closer to the avowed objectives of the Republican platform?

In any case, underlying Soviet apprehension had to be subordinated to the obligatory gesture which just might be reciprocated, and, if not, serve as the start of an accusatory record. Thus, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in a letter of January 28, 1981, answering charges against Soviet policy contained in a letter from his new counterpart, Alexander Haig, expressed an interest in an exchange of views on a wide range of issues. Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, from the rostrum of the Soviet Party Congress in late February, offered another peace program and a summit meeting. After a confusing flicker of interest in the summit, the offer was dutifully turned down by Secretary Haig on the grounds that an unprepared summit would be "self-defeating in the extreme."

On the surface this was the end of the initial minuet. But, it was later revealed, the dialogue of the two Presidents continued in an exchange of initially secret letters. In early April, President Reagan, from his hospital bed, sent a hand-written letter to Brezhnev in which he asked, "Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and economic philosophies and governmental policies to keep us from considering the very real, everyday problems of our peoples?"1 This was a far cry from liars, cheats, etc.; it suggested at least a greater pragmatism than the Administration's public rhetoric. Brezhnev's reply on May 25 was properly cantankerous, but he reverted to his summit proposal: "An exchange of correspondence has its limitations, and in this sense a private conversation is better." But either Brezhnev's expectations or his interest was waning. Brezhnev now also favored a "well-prepared" meeting at a "moment acceptable to both of us."

There was a four-month lapse, until a Reagan letter of September 22 (released only in paraphrase). The tone was sterner, the accusations crisper, the rhetoric more reminiscent of the campaign. Yet, another shift was evident. With his initial defense budget battles behind him, the complexities of various strategic decisions (the MX missile and the B-1 bomber) pressing in on him, the pressure from Europe growing, and Haig about to meet Gromyko, the President emphasized that the United States was interested in a "stable and constructive relationship" with the U.S.S.R. The letter set forth what was, in effect, a rough agenda for Soviet-American relations: arms control and security, geopolitical conflicts, economic relations, and the situation in Poland. This was not a radically new framework. Except for Poland, the issues had been on the agenda for at least a decade.

On the first issue, arms control, the Reagan Administration has moved from preconceived positions on the Right toward the mainstream of postwar American foreign policy. The President's speech and proposals of November 18 may well represent a turning point; he not only emphasized his commitment to major reductions in strategic weapons, but he also proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union agree on "zero" intermediate range missiles, which could mean canceling the intended American deployment in Europe. On the second issue-regional conflicts-the clash of interests between the two powers has remained severe and threatens to worsen. The third issue, economic relations, was becoming less relevant as other forces have overtaken American policy. And on the fourth issue, the Polish revolution, broad uncertainties cast an ominous shadow over the future.