The Middle East: The Burdens of Empire

John C. Campbell

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1978

Article preview: first 500 of 8,491 words total.

Summary:  Throughout 1978 the Middle East was at or near the top of the Carter Administration's foreign policy agenda. For the first time in 30 years an Arab-Israeli peace settlement - at least a partial one - was a practical possibility once President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 had opened the door. As the year began, it was clear that the parties would need mediation and help to reach the promised land of peace and that the United States, the old friend of Israel and new friend of Egypt, was admirably placed to escort them there. The Soviet Union, on bad terms with both Israel and Egypt, was out of the picture. The signs for productive American diplomacy were favorable.

John C. Campbell is former Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of, among other books, Defense of the Middle East (1960) and The West and the Middle East (1972).

Throughout 1978 the Middle East was at or near the top of the Carter Administration's foreign policy agenda. For the first time in 30 years an Arab-Israeli peace settlement - at least a partial one - was a practical possibility once President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 had opened the door. As the year began, it was clear that the parties would need mediation and help to reach the promised land of peace and that the United States, the old friend of Israel and new friend of Egypt, was admirably placed to escort them there. The Soviet Union, on bad terms with both Israel and Egypt, was out of the picture. The signs for productive American diplomacy were favorable.

Not all American interests in the Middle East were wrapped up in the Arab-Israeli question, although Washington tended to give that impression by the time and effort devoted to it. Stability in the Persian Gulf region and access to its oil were of the highest importance from the standpoint of the global balance with the Soviet Union and from that of the economic well-being of the West. Iran and Saudi Arabia had long been regarded by the United States as the keys to protection of those interests. The Shah of Iran and the Saudi royal family had been cooperating with Washington for more than a quarter of a century. These traditional friendly relations, by 1978, were flourishing in the heady atmosphere of expanding trade, grandiose development programs dependent on American technology and management, and large sales of American arms. Soviet influence, except in Iraq, was scarcely to be seen in the Gulf. Here, too, the signs were favorable. Washington was moving confidently forward with its established policies.

For five years the United States had been living off the fruits of the October 1973 War. It may seem strange, but that moment of crisis for the United States, which revealed U.S. vulnerability to the new economic power of OPEC, also left it in a stronger political position than ever before, as it gained new influence in the Arab world without losing its special relationship with Israel, and as it stepped forward as the principal partner in the security and economic development of the oil-producing states of the Gulf. It was not in the nature of the Middle East, however, that these particular circumstances should last. America's destiny in the Middle East must reckon with a changing scene and, as past experience can confirm and as the events of 1978 were to show, is not entirely determined in Washington. It may be affected, more than has been apparent in the past few years, by decisions taken in Moscow. Most of all, it is dependent upon the dynamics of Middle Eastern politics, forces not subject to control by any outside power.

At the end of the year, as these factors came into play, the signs were less favorable. The Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations had not produced a treaty, and on other aspects ...

End of preview: first 500 of 8,491 words total.