Israel: Borders and Security

Colonel Merrill A. McPeak

From Foreign Affairs, April 1976

Summary:  "Israel," as Mrs. Meir put it, "is entitled to defensible borders." But where might such borders be drawn? The lines on which Israel's army stood at the end of the war of June 1967 seemed formidable, but have disappeared into history. The U.N. Security Council, in its celebrated Resolution 242 of November 1967, visualized that "secure and recognized boundaries" might be placed essentially along the lines obtaining before the outbreak of the June hostilities. Although it has refused to "draw maps," Israel has made it plain that the old lines will not do, in part owing to security concerns. But genuine security depends on regional accommodation, which the Arab states say cannot occur until all of the occupied territory is returned. All parties agree that some kind of demilitarization arrangement in returned territory would be needed in any overall settlement, but little serious public attention has been given to ways in which comprehensive demilitarization might be useful as a security safeguard in the context of comprehensive territorial return.

All this is the stuff of which renewed tension is made. But the greater danger is that such a process, if continued in future steps, will lead to the "remilitarization" of the territories. Moreover, if, as seems likely, demilitarization arrangements are a desired element in any future overall settlement, then the situation is complicated rather than simplified by the steps already taken. For example, for the Arabs to agree to the type of total demilitarization proposed here would mean that they must withdraw heavy equipment already in place. Psychologically, at least, this is a more painful step than simple agreement not to reintroduce such equipment. For this reason, even if the United States is unable to move the parties toward an overall settlement now, it is essential that we have some vision of the final settlement we hope to help construct. Otherwise, we may unwittingly create impediments to an overall settlement during the step-by-step process.

VII

It has not been the purpose of this analysis to offer yet another comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace plan, but rather to deal with security-related territorial concerns. Regarding this limited aspect of the problem, it should be understood that Israel must make the important concessions. It is Israel that is being asked to depart East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sharm-el-Sheikh. Israel has vowed never to leave any of these places and it is by no means certain that it can be induced to forsake this vow. For it to do so would require at a minimum both great statesmanship in Israel and considerable pressure from the United States.

On the other hand, a comprehensive settlement would call for the Arabs to make far-reaching, but largely intangible, concessions-in particular, to recognize Israel and normalize relations. In extracting these concessions, it is territorial return which constitutes Israel's chief bargaining counter. But the suggestion here is that, insofar as security is concerned, what Israel requires in exchange for territory is demilitarization. Following an overall settlement in which Israel trades territory for Arab pledges to end belligerency, obstacles to normalization are sure to crop up; renewed tension is a believable forecast. Having given up cash for credit, Israel is likely to feel betrayed if relations subsequently deteriorate. But it need not feel threatened, provided only that returned territories are demilitarized.

Footnotes

1 World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1975, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Figures are based on constant 1970 prices and exchange rates.

2 Robert W. Tucker, "Israel and the United States: From Dependence to Nuclear Weapons?" Commentary, November 1975.

3 John C. Campbell, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy," Foreign Affairs, October 1970.

4 Mr. Ball's fullest and most recent discussion is in "Kissinger's Paper Peace: How Not to Handle the Middle East," The Atlantic, February 1976.