Israel: Borders and Security

Colonel Merrill A. McPeak

From Foreign Affairs, April 1976

Summary:  "Israel," as Mrs. Meir put it, "is entitled to defensible borders." But where might such borders be drawn? The lines on which Israel's army stood at the end of the war of June 1967 seemed formidable, but have disappeared into history. The U.N. Security Council, in its celebrated Resolution 242 of November 1967, visualized that "secure and recognized boundaries" might be placed essentially along the lines obtaining before the outbreak of the June hostilities. Although it has refused to "draw maps," Israel has made it plain that the old lines will not do, in part owing to security concerns. But genuine security depends on regional accommodation, which the Arab states say cannot occur until all of the occupied territory is returned. All parties agree that some kind of demilitarization arrangement in returned territory would be needed in any overall settlement, but little serious public attention has been given to ways in which comprehensive demilitarization might be useful as a security safeguard in the context of comprehensive territorial return.

(a) A ceiling would be set on Arab military forces allowed to reenter each of the territories. Very small forces, perhaps as few as 1,000 men each, would be allowed in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights, where their main purpose would be to show the flag. Larger but still quite modest forces would be needed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to ensure public order.

(b) No heavy weapons or combat aircraft would be permitted to re-enter. Equipment for returning Arab forces would be restricted to small arms and automatic weapons below .50 caliber, but no mortars, artillery or missiles; trucks and armored personnel carriers, but no tanks; helicopters, liaison and cargo aircraft, but no overflight or basing of fighters or bombers.

(c) No intrusion of armed ships into waters adjacent to returned territories would be permitted.

(d) Both sides would accept international verification and inspection of the limits established. If Israel were unwilling to accept international, U.N.-sponsored inspection, the United States should be willing to assist with this function for a limited time. Inspection and verification by "national means"-that is, reconnaissance flights by the parties over the demilitarized zones-would not be permitted.

(e) The limitations outlined above would apply to the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the Golan Heights, they would apply to all the ground still under Israeli control. They would apply to the entire Sinai, including areas from which Israel has withdrawn or been expelled already and the small salient near Port Fuad not captured by Israel in 1967. Demilitarization provisions should not apply inside Israel's pre-June 5 borders. However, if this were to constitute a final stumbling block, Israel should agree to face-saving provisions involving token demilitarization inside its borders.

Such a proposal aims at removing strategic obstacles to an overall settlement by creating the possibility of an effective deterrent to war. Egypt is the key; without Egyptian participation, other Arab governments would likely be deterred from major attack. And Egypt could not attack Israel because it could not concentrate forces east of the Canal. To be foolproof, however, the checkpoint for Egyptian personnel and equipment would have to be at the Canal. Once into the Sinai, it is just conceivable that equipment could be hidden and forces prepared for a surprise build-up. That is why demilitarization of areas already returned is an important consideration in the Sinai and less so on the Golan. With total demilitarization, no Egyptian demand for removal of observer forces could produce a sudden crisis, as was the case in 1967. Moving Egyptian forces across the full expanse of the Sinai would require time in which Israel could mobilize and international pressures could come into play. Even so, the sides should be urged to accept the sensible provision that neither be able to dictate removal of observer forces.

Since it is acknowledged that Israel's security ultimately rests on the strength of its armed forces, it is of more than passing interest that the proposal outlined here would have the effect of perpetuating Israel's local military superiority. Israel would be able to defeat quickly Arab forces of the kind permitted to return and would be able to do so without major new, and potentially destabilizing, developments in the arms race. The Arabs understand this fact, which is at the bottom of their stated unwillingness to demilitarize returned territory without offsetting demilitarization in Israel. An outsider cannot know whether this is a serious, as opposed to a negotiating, position. Israel could counter by pointing out that most of the demilitarization would take place on territory it now, in fact, controls. If military forces of the sides were to draw back in step from present positions until Israel's Army was camped on the pre-June 5 lines, Cairo and Amman would be demilitarized, and Damascus nearly so.

But it is the enormous appeal of total return which must be relied upon to produce an Arab concession on demilitarization. Thus, each milestone passed in an extended step-by-step diplomacy successively reduces the incentive to demilitarize. For the years ahead, we should like to help create a situation in which Arab leaders would be able to stress to their domestic audiences that, no matter how much all would enjoy another round with Israel, it is just not possible, and that this situation arose necessarily out of the requirement to regain territory. This line will be credible only if territorial return is more or less sudden and total.

This is not to say that total return is a straightforward proposition. Like demilitarization, the concept needs to be fleshed out. At Latrun and elsewhere the old lines require mutually agreed modification-"minor rectification" is a term often used. Minor rectification of the borders contains in itself a network of problems, each dauntingly complicated. But, with demilitarization of returned territory, these problems could be seen for what they are: a variety of disputes involving history, emotion, religious belief and property rights, not security.

In addition to calling for a change of focus from incremental to overall settlement, this analysis suggests the possibility of a defect in the specifics of the step-by-step procedure as executed to date. "Step diplomacy" has been attacked cogently on a number of grounds, notably by George Ball.4 But the possible impact of the steps on prospects for eventual demilitarization has not drawn widespread comment. The First Egypt-Israel Disengagement Agreement (January 18, 1974) reportedly authorized Egypt to leave 7,000 troops, 36 artillery pieces and 30 tanks on the Sinai side of the Canal. The Second Agreement (September 4, 1975), in addition to enlarging the area under Egyptian control, specified that Egypt could station eight standard infantry battalions, 75 tanks and 72 artillery pieces east of the Canal, with total manpower limited to 8,000 men. Reconnaissance aircraft of either side may fly up to the midpoint of the buffer zone between their forward positions. The Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement (May 31, 1974) also reportedly permits the limited reintroduction of tanks and artillery into Golan areas evacuated by Israel.