Israel: Borders and Security

Colonel Merrill A. McPeak

From Foreign Affairs, April 1976

Summary:  "Israel," as Mrs. Meir put it, "is entitled to defensible borders." But where might such borders be drawn? The lines on which Israel's army stood at the end of the war of June 1967 seemed formidable, but have disappeared into history. The U.N. Security Council, in its celebrated Resolution 242 of November 1967, visualized that "secure and recognized boundaries" might be placed essentially along the lines obtaining before the outbreak of the June hostilities. Although it has refused to "draw maps," Israel has made it plain that the old lines will not do, in part owing to security concerns. But genuine security depends on regional accommodation, which the Arab states say cannot occur until all of the occupied territory is returned. All parties agree that some kind of demilitarization arrangement in returned territory would be needed in any overall settlement, but little serious public attention has been given to ways in which comprehensive demilitarization might be useful as a security safeguard in the context of comprehensive territorial return.

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If this analysis is correct, Israel does not have a strong case, on the narrow argument of its own physical security requirements, for retaining any of the territory occupied after June 1967. All things considered, no set of borders seems a great deal better from a security standpoint than the armistice lines established in 1949-that is, the pre-June 5, 1967 borders. Indeed, if complete return of the occupied territories opened the prospect of peace, Israel's security interest, broadly defined, would require this step. However, Israel cannot be sure that peace would accompany withdrawal. Its experience leads to the contrary expectation. There is much truth in the Israeli contention that each of the five wars of Israel's modern history was thrust upon it.

In these wars the performance of Israel's armed forces has been remarkable. However, if the purposes of armed strength are first to deter conflict and only second to end such conflict as does occur on terms favorable to the nation, then Israel's impressive success must be laid alongside impressive failure. Reserving consideration of nuclear weapons for a moment, we have no reason to believe that the Arabs will ever be deterred by Israel's military power, even if its record and reputation are reinforced by a succession of new victories. The question of how to defeat the Arabs has been answered five times; the question of how to deter them awaits an answer.

This is not to say that the strength and competence of Israel's armed forces are unimportant or have somehow become irrelevant. On the contrary, Israel's security will continue to be linked with its military capabilities relative to the Arab states; these capabilities must be preserved to ensure its survival. Note, however, that none of the qualities which the world has come to associate with Israeli arms-movement, flexibility, imagination-relies on the possession of specific territory. To discover the true composition of Israel's security, ask an Israeli general whether he would trade these fighting qualities for the chance to occupy a strong position.

Generals rightly resist such choices. Indeed, no general worth his stars is likely to think of these as exclusive alternatives; he will want both a fine fighting force and a strong opening position, as well as any other advantage available. But maintaining or increasing military advantage relative to Arab countries which now have access to growing technical and financial resources is a cruel task for a state as small as Israel. For this reason, and to avoid the risks seen in a condition of increasing dependence on the United States, Professor Robert W. Tucker has argued that Israel is likely soon to reconsider its stance on nuclear weapons-and indeed that it should do so.2

While official statements have understandably avoided unnecessary precision, Israel's policy on nuclear arms seems to rest now on two elements: a commitment not to be the "first to introduce" nuclear weapons into the Middle East and the avowed intention to retain the "option" to develop such weapons, should they be required. Each of these policy elements is essentially meaningless. In a crisis Israel could claim that nuclear-capable systems had already made an appearance in the region-that no chastity remained for Israel to protect. Moreover, the circumstances in which Israel might require nuclear arms are not those which would allow an elaborate development program to be undertaken at the time. If an "option" is indeed to be possessed, it means that development must take place in advance, with only final loading and arming steps, at best, postponed.

To date, Israel has seen the advantage of a strong conventional posture backed up by the deliberate ambiguity of a nuclear "option." Professor Tucker suggests that, for Israel, the attractions of a declaratory strategy of nuclear deterrence may soon become irresistible. Among other claimed benefits, Tucker argues that such a strategy would permit de-emphasis of conventional force, thereby reducing defense spending, and would markedly diminish preoccupation with secure borders, thereby creating more flexibility on return of occupied territory.

There are a number of both theoretical and practical reasons, which can be mentioned here in summary form only, why Israel should not adopt such a policy. On the level of theory, the first problem is stability. Whereas so far the Arab states seem able to ignore Israel's nuclear "option," no one should doubt that they will be obliged to follow suit if Israel declares a policy of nuclear deterrence. We should not assume that both sides will move immediately to secure, second-strike systems; more likely they will retrace the path taken by every nascent nuclear power. Accordingly, we should expect a gradual evolution from exposed, first-strike, to survivable, second-strike systems. Survivability is always relative and, in general, the more survivable a system is the more it costs. As the parties move closer to true second-strike postures, they are likely to see postulated defense savings evaporate. In view of resource limitations, the evolution to second-strike postures will be fitful, with extended periods during which capabilities are grossly asymmetrical and in which there is a fair measure of uncertainty about opposing capabilities. There will be powerful voices on each side urging that the other's resolve be tested, and on each side urging that resolve be shown. These conditions-asymmetry, uncertainty, provocation-provide a textbook definition of instability.

Nor should we assume that the eventual existence of balanced, second-strike postures will automatically produce stable deterrence. Such stability as exists in the U.S.-Soviet relationship has been a product of rational and conservative behavior, with each side accepting limitations on objectives as well as means. Some may claim that it is characteristic of nuclear balance to produce rational and conservative behavior, but this is not a hypothesis we should wish to see tested in the Middle East. What is immediately at stake in the Middle East-territorial integrity, physical security, cultural identity-are survival values par excellence. Values of similar magnitude have not been a day-to-day issue between powers possessing balanced nuclear strength. On those rare occasions when the stakes were raised-e.g., the Cuban missile crisis-the world reached points of maximum danger. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli conflict displays some aspects of a fight between brothers. That this is so offers a hope of reconciliation, but it also means that emotions are likely to outrun careful calculation. It is the family arguments-Greek versus Turkish Cypriot, Catholic versus Protestant Irish, North versus South Korean-that we should least like to see nuclear-armed.

Even if the sides were to settle into stable deterrent conditions, this might provide cold comfort for Israel. To attain such conditions, each side must prepare protected, essentially symmetrical second-strike capabilities. That is, stability requires that each side stand wholly exposed to the destructive power of the other. It is an interesting question whether Israel would find such "equivalence" agreeable. Though they have threatened Israel's extinction, the Arab states have never had a reasonable prospect of making good the threat. This would change if the term "military balance" in the Middle East acquired a literal meaning in lieu of its current usage as a euphemism for Israeli superiority.