Israel: Borders and Security

Colonel Merrill A. McPeak

From Foreign Affairs, April 1976

Summary:  "Israel," as Mrs. Meir put it, "is entitled to defensible borders." But where might such borders be drawn? The lines on which Israel's army stood at the end of the war of June 1967 seemed formidable, but have disappeared into history. The U.N. Security Council, in its celebrated Resolution 242 of November 1967, visualized that "secure and recognized boundaries" might be placed essentially along the lines obtaining before the outbreak of the June hostilities. Although it has refused to "draw maps," Israel has made it plain that the old lines will not do, in part owing to security concerns. But genuine security depends on regional accommodation, which the Arab states say cannot occur until all of the occupied territory is returned. All parties agree that some kind of demilitarization arrangement in returned territory would be needed in any overall settlement, but little serious public attention has been given to ways in which comprehensive demilitarization might be useful as a security safeguard in the context of comprehensive territorial return.

One can imagine three possible outcomes for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel can return all, some or none of these territories to Arab control. Each of these alternatives poses challenges which are, for the most part, variations on the theme of internal security. This is so because consideration of these territories approaches the heart of the matter: How may Jews and Arabs live together?

Suppose Israel determines to incorporate all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, either through outright annexation, as is already the case in East Jerusalem, or through continued military occupation which has a provisional veneer but de facto permanence. Assuming that a large number of Arabs are not simply expelled, this action would add about a million people to the already sizable Arab minority in Israel. Moreover, the natural rate of increase of the Arab population is about double that of the Jews. Thus, while there is little near-term likelihood that the Arabs can "drive Israel into the sea," there is a real possibility that they might submerge it demographically within present defense perimeters.

Already the "Right of Return" does not extend to non-Jews; Arab Israelis may not serve in the armed forces; and Arabs in the occupied territories are denied effective political organization and participation in government. No doubt these measures embarrass many Israelis, but they are necessary. In an Israel where Arabs constitute an increasingly large fraction of population, there can be no doubt that to accord Arabs full rights of citizenship would mean the eventual end of Israel as a Zionist state. On the other hand, institutionalizing a set of repressive measures designed to control a growing Arab population means the end of Israel as a democracy. Those who define Israel's security as requiring the preservation of both the Jewish and the democratic character of the state understand that at least some of the West Bank/Gaza Strip must be returned.

How is this to be done? One possibility is to find a formula for returning as much of the population and as little of the territory as possible. If, say, Israel were to retain the Gaza Strip, and in the West Bank to return only the string of Arab towns-Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron-along the Judean/Samarian hilltops, together with a link to Jordan at Jericho, Israel might take in upwards of half a million fewer Arabs, and population dynamics would be manageable, at least for a long time. (With an additional provision for a chain of Israeli strongpoints along the Jordan River, this plan looks something like the one offered in 1968 by Yigal Allon.)

Israel might be able to find someone to whom control could be handed on such terms. But, regardless of the extent of territory returned, or to whom it is handed over, terrorist attacks on Israel originating from the returned area would certainly occur. The record shows that such attacks have been stopped neither by Israeli administration of captured territories nor by Israel's reprisal policy (which therefore clearly requires review). Thus, for Israel, the relevant security problem is how to reduce terrorism in circumstances of renewed Arab control of the population.

Two aspects of this matter make it particularly troublesome. First, a feature of Israel's rather enlightened occupation policy has been to encourage Arabs and Jews to cross the old lines for economic and cultural purposes. For Israel to reverse this policy following restoration of Arab control would be wrongheaded and, in the degree to which Israel has become dependent on Arab labor, economically unsound. But, if relative freedom of movement is continued, terrorist infiltration is bound to be difficult to manage, no matter whether all, or only some, of the West Bank/Gaza Strip territories are returned.

Second, Israel has made clear its expectation that Jews are settled permanently in the occupied territories. This holds true with special force for Jewish holy places like Hebron and in Jerusalem itself and may also be the case with the settlements around Gaza and on the Golan. No one knows how many Jews actually would stay behind to live under Arab rule, but if a considerable number were to do so, then we would have a situation rather like an exchange of hostages, or the ancient practice of enemies drinking wine from the same glass. Under such conditions, each side has an interest in making its actions acceptable to the other and the key question is the degree of control exercised by the respective authorities. In brief, can the parties keep someone from poisoning the wine?

These considerations argue that, in any case, but especially if a Jewish population of any size is left behind, Israel has an interest in passing control to an authoritative Arab administration. The best, perhaps the only, way to control Arab terrorism is for Arabs to do the controlling. However, by retaining portions of the occupied territories, Israel would bequeath a legacy of political weakness. The cry would arise immediately for further, complete return-"every inch"-creating an inflammatory issue, diminishing the authority of any Arab government cooperating in partial return, and threatening Jews left behind. Terrorism would receive an additional stimulus while at the same time Arab ability to deal with it would be reduced.

Thus, Israel's security may well require the return of all, or substantially all, of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to confer legitimacy on the restored Arab government and enable it to exercise real control. Even so, the prognosis for curtailing terrorism remains bleak. Around the world, none of the most vulnerable targets-the industrial democracies-has a ready answer. Israel's special problem in this regard may gradually subside as the Palestinians come to accept whatever political arrangements are worked out in their behalf. Until such reconciliation occurs, Israel's best prospect of controlling terrorism is that strong Arab governments materialize in the returned territories.

Strong government in the returned territories also means that Israel must accept the presence there of Arab forces: regular Jordanian forces (and possibly Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip) if control reverts to former Arab authorities; regular Palestinian forces if a separate Palestinian entity is established. However, such forces need not constitute a threat to Israel if they are limited in size and equipage. Here again the security problem focuses not on the extent of territory returned but on the nature and degree of demilitarization.